

Tripartite 2019 – Tokyo

Session 3 'Digitalisation'

George Reilly

IACS Cyber Systems Panel Chairman



Coordination of IACS Role



Recognition within IACS



IACS



Developing Recommendations

Functionally Arranged



IACS Recommendations Relationship with IMO and the NIST Framework



FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

IACS

Cyber risks addressed in safety management systems (SMS)

Regulatory Background - IMO

- MSC.1/Circ.1526 was superseded by (MSC-FAL. 1/Circ.3) in 5 July 2017.
- This now has more prominence due to IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) which 'encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems (SMS) no later than the first annual verification of the company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.'



... paragraph 11 highlights that some agencies appear focusing their approach to Cyber Risk Management through the ISPS Code

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 10 101st session 26 March Agenda item 4 Criginal: ENG Pre-session public releas MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY Cyber risk management in Safety Management Systems Submitted by United States, ICS and BIMCO SUMMARY Executive summary: This document highlights concerns regarding pote inconsistencies in the implementation of the requirements embo in resolution MSC.428(98) and requests that the Committee ta action to avoid such inconsistencies emerging as significant iss between now and 1 January 2021 Strategic direction, if Not applicable applicable: Output: 5.2, 6.1 Action to be taken: Paragraph 16 Related documents: MSC 101/4/1; resolution MSC.428(98) and MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3			INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
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Committee agreed physical security aspects of cyber security, should be addressed in Ship Security Plans under the ISPS Code. However, the Committee also agreed that this should **not** be considered as requiring a company to establish a separate cyber security management system operating in parallel with the company SMS

IACS

Industry Guidelines - Version 3





Consolidation



Consolidation of the Recommendations into one Document



Consolidation through the **Goal Based Standards** format

A format that is familiar to IACS and many stakeholders

Starting with a declared GOAL: Ships should be designed, built, operated and maintained to be cyber-resilient

Using elements that are familiar to the stakeholders that are familiar to IACS and the Joint Working Group





Consolidation Steps

- Agreement of the defined goal and a set of Functional Requirements
- Review of existing (Recommendation) material and the feedback that has been received
- Consolidated document will address the criteria for technical elements relating to construction and not cover operational elements
- Industry Standards to be referenced for operational aspects
- Only new construction ships considered
- Identify how consolidated document address the 5 NIST Functional Elements (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover)





While the most intense activity within IACS will revolve around the consolidation of the Recommendations, Cyber Systems Panel will be available to identify, prioritize and progress other related areas that will themselves become priorities that need to be in place before the January 2021 Deadline arrives.



Thank you for your attention!

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References

Maritime cyber risk

Maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of the extent to which a technology asset could be threatened by a potential circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-related operational, safety or security failures as a consequence of information or systems being corrupted, lost or compromised.

Cyber risk management means the process of identifying, analysing, assessing and communicating a cyberrelated risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or mitigating it to an acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of actions taken to stakeholders

The overall goal is to support safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to cyber risks.

IMO guidance

IMO has issued <u>MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3</u> Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management.

The guidelines provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities and include functional elements that support effective cyber risk management. The recommendations can be incorporated into existing risk management processes and are complementary to the safety and security management practices already established by IMO.

The Maritime Safety Committee, at its 98th session in June 2017, also adopted <u>Resolution MSC.428(98)</u> - Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems. The resolution encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in existing safety management systems (as defined in the ISM Code) no later than the first annual verification of the company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.

Other guidance and standards

Guidelines on <u>Cyber Security</u> on board Ships issued by BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERMANAGER, INTERTANKO, OCIMF, IUMI and WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL.

<u>ISO/IEC 27001</u> standard on Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Requirements. Published jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

United States National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the <u>NIST Framework</u>).

MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management (94 KB)

Resolution MSC.428(98) - Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems (12 KB)